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абстрактный объект
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[ http://www.iks-media.ru/glossary/index.html?glossid=2400324]Тематики
- электросвязь, основные понятия
EN
Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > abstract object
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3 abstract object
Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > abstract object
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ООПабстрактный объект; объект, принадлежащий абстрактному классу (см. abstract class)English-Russian dictionary of computer science and programming > abstract object
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1) Математика: абстрактный объект2) Программирование: объект, принадлежащий абстрактному классу -
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Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > abstract object
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1) возражать2) объект || объектный3) предмет || предметный•- completely symmetric object - universally repelling object -
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English-Russian dictionary of computer science and programming > abstract
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1. noun2) (purpose) Ziel, daswith this object in mind or view — mit diesem Ziel [vor Augen]
with the object of doing something — in der Absicht, etwas zu tun
3) (obstacle)money/time etc. is no object — Geld/Zeit usw. spielt keine Rolle
4) (Ling.) Objekt, das2. intransitive verb2) (have objection or dislike) etwas dagegen habenobject to somebody/something — etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben
3. transitive verbobject to somebody's doing something — etwas dagegen haben, dass jemand etwas tut
* * *I ['ob‹ikt] noun1) (a thing that can be seen or felt: There were various objects on the table.) der Gegenstand2) (an aim or intention: His main object in life was to become rich.) die Absicht3) (the word or words in a sentence or phrase which represent(s) the person or thing affected by the action of the verb: He hit me; You can eat what you like.) das ObjektII [əb'‹ekt] verb(often with to) to feel or express dislike or disapproval: He wanted us to travel on foot but I objected (to that). Einwendungen machen- academic.ru/50972/objection">objection- objectionable
- objectionably* * *object1[ˈɒbʤɪkt, AM ˈɑ:b-]na glass/metal \object ein Gegenstand aus Glas/Metall\object lesson Anschauungsunterricht mto understand the nature of \objects PHILOS das Wesen der Dinge erkennento treat sb as \object jdn wie ein Objekt behandelnwhat was the \object of it all? was war der [Sinn und] Zweck des Ganzen?\object of business Geschäftszweck mthe \object of the exercise [der] Zweck der Übungthe \object of the exercise is to increase sales Ziel [o Sinn] und Zweck der Übung ist es, die Verkaufszahlen zu steigernimmediate \object Nahziel ntto have an \object in life ein Lebensziel habento defeat one's own \object sich dat selbst schadento make sth one's \object sich dat etw zum Ziel setzenher little daughter was the sole \object of her love ihre ganze Liebe galt ihrer kleinen Tochterthe \object of desire das Objekt der Begierdeto be/become an \object of pity/scorn zum Gegenstand des Mitleids/Spotts sein/werdendirect/indirect \object Akkusativ-/Dativobjekt nt, direktes/indirektes Objektmoney is no \object Geld spielt keine Rollesalary no \object Gehalt [ist] Nebensacheobject2[əbˈʤekt]I. viwould anyone \object if we started the meeting now? hätte irgendjemand etwas dagegen, wenn wir nun mit der Sitzung beginnen [würden]?▪ to \object to sth (oppose, disapprove) gegen etw akk sein, etw ablehnen; (dislike, mind) etwas gegen etw akk haben; (stronger) sich dat etw verbittenI \object to your[r] taking 80% of the profits ich habe etwas dagegen, dass Sie 80% des Gewinns einstreichendo you \object to people smoking at the table? stört es Sie, wenn Leute bei Tisch rauchen?I \object to this language! ich verbitte mir diese Sprache!to \object to an attitude eine Einstellung missbilligen2. (protest) protestieren, Einwände erhebenII. vt▪ to \object sth etw einwenden“I can't allow that,” the chairman \objected „das kann ich nicht zulassen“, protestierte der Vorsitzende▪ to \object that... einwenden, dass...* * *I ['ɒbdZɪkt]nhe treats her like an object — er behandelt sie wie ein Ding or Objekt
she became an object of pity — mit ihr musste man Mitleid haben
he was an object of scorn —
the cat is the sole object of her love — ihre ganze Liebe gilt ihrer Katze
2) (= aim) Ziel nt, Absicht f, Zweck mwith the sole object (of doing) —
he has no object in life — er hat kein Ziel im Leben or kein Lebensziel
what's the object (of staying here)? — wozu or zu welchem Zweck (bleiben wir hier)?
the object of the exercise — der Zweck or (fig also) Sinn der Übung
that defeats the object —
he made it his object to... — er setzte es sich (dat) zum Ziel, zu...
3) (= obstacle) Hinderungsgrund mmoney/distance is no object — Geld/Entfernung spielt keine Rolle, Geld/Entfernung (ist) nebensächlich
II [əb'dZekt]direct/indirect object — direktes/indirektes Objekt, Akkusativ-/Dativobjekt nt
1. vidagegen sein; (= make objection, protest) protestieren; (= be against in discussion etc) Einwände haben (to gegen); (= raise objection) Einwände erheben; (= disapprove) Anstoß nehmen (to an +dat), sich stören (to an +dat)if you don't object — wenn es (Ihnen) recht ist, wenn Sie nichts dagegen haben
do you object to my smoking? — stört es (Sie), wenn ich rauche?, haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?
he objects to my drinking — er nimmt daran Anstoß or er hat etwas dagegen, dass ich trinke
I object to people smoking in my living room — ich verbitte mir, dass in meinem Wohnzimmer geraucht wird
I object most strongly to his smoking — ich missbillige es aufs Äußerste, dass er raucht
I object most strongly to his argument — ich lehne seine Argumentation energisch ab
I object to him bossing me around —
I object to orange curtains with green wallpaper — Vorhänge in Orange mit grünen Tapeten, da protestiere ich!
she objects to all that noise —
he doesn't object to the odd drink — er hat nichts gegen ein Gläschen ab und zu (einzuwenden)
2. vteinwenden* * *object1 [əbˈdʒekt]B v/i1. Einwendungen machen, Einspruch erheben, protestieren ( alle:to gegen):I object ich erhebe Einspruch2. etwas einwenden, etwas dagegen haben:object to sth etwas beanstanden, etwas gegen eine Sache (einzuwenden) haben;do you object to my smoking? haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?;if you don’t object wenn Sie nichts dagegen habenobject2 [ˈɒbdʒıkt; US ˈɑb-] sthe object of his study der Gegenstand seiner Studie;object of invention Erfindungsgegenstand;money (is) no object Geld oder der Preis spielt keine Rollewhat an object you are! wie sehen Sie denn aus!;a pretty object it looked es sah schön aus3. Ziel n, Zweck m, Absicht f:with the object of doing sth mit der Absicht, etwas zu tun;this was not the object of the exercise das war nicht der Zweck der Übung;there is no object in doing that es hat keinen Zweck oder Sinn, das zu tun;have no object in life kein Ziel haben;make it one’s object to do sth es sich zum Ziel setzen, etwas zu tun4. LING5. PHIL Nicht-Ich n, Objekt nobj. (object.) abk1. object2. objection3. objective* * *1. noun2) (purpose) Ziel, daswith this object in mind or view — mit diesem Ziel [vor Augen]
with the object of doing something — in der Absicht, etwas zu tun
3) (obstacle)money/time etc. is no object — Geld/Zeit usw. spielt keine Rolle
4) (Ling.) Objekt, das2. intransitive verb1) (state objection) Einwände/einen Einwand erheben (to gegen); (protest) protestieren (to gegen)2) (have objection or dislike) etwas dagegen habenobject to somebody/something — etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben
3. transitive verbobject to somebody's doing something — etwas dagegen haben, dass jemand etwas tut
* * *n.Gegenstand m.Objekt -e n.Ziel -e n.Zweck -e m. v.Einwendungen machen ausdr.widersprechen v. -
11 object
= OBJ1) объекта) одно из базовых понятий объектно-ориентированного программирования, ООП (см. OOP), с помощью которого осуществляется программное представление сущностей реального мира. Объект - экземпляр класса; обладает свойствами наследования, инкапсуляции и полиморфизма. Объединяет в себе данные (property) и операции над ними (методы, method). Реализуется в компьютере как динамически размещаемая сложная структура данных, т. е. каждый объект имеет собственный набор полей, определённых его классом, а методы объекты используют совместно. Объект может рассматриваться как абстрактный тип данных (abstract data type). Каждый объект имеет собственное имя или идентификационный номер. Объекты создаются и уничтожаются с помощью специальных методов - конструкторов (constructor) и деструкторов (destructor). Структуры данных и реализация методов объекта невидима для других объектов в системе. Объекты взаимодействуют между собой, посылая друг другу сообщения (message). В ответ на сообщение объект выполняет один из методов, чтобы удовлетворить полученный запрос, при этом интерпретация сообщения лежит целиком на объекте-получателе. Таким образом различные объекты могут реагировать на одно и то же сообщение по разному. Действия, выполняемые объектом, называют его поведением (behaviour). Объекты - основная единица построения программной системы. Объекты с общими свойствами и методами объединены в классы. Чаще всего термин "объект" трактуется как синоним слова экземпляр, однако иногда может использоваться и для обозначения классасм. тж. active object, aggregate object, ancestor object, class object, collection, composite object, conceptual object, container object, database object, dynamic object, encapsulation, information hiding, inheritance, instance, object conversion, object handler, object header, object identity, object interface, object library, object manager, object model, object orientation, object pool, object reference, object reuse, object technology, object type, OODB, ODL, OOL, passive object, polymorphism, reusable object, Simulaсм. тж. 3D object2) предмет3) цельсм. тж. target4) объектныйАнгло-русский толковый словарь терминов и сокращений по ВТ, Интернету и программированию. > object
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['ɒbdʒekt] UK / US1. nGegenstand m, (abstract) Objekt nt, (purpose) Ziel nt [əb'dʒekt]2. vidagegen sein, (raise objection) Einwände erheben (to gegen), (morally) Anstoß nehmen (to an + dat)do you object to my smoking? — haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?
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13 object
['ɒbdʒekt] UK / US1. nGegenstand m, (abstract) Objekt nt, (purpose) Ziel nt [əb'dʒekt]2. vidagegen sein, (raise objection) Einwände erheben (to gegen), (morally) Anstoß nehmen (to an + dat)do you object to my smoking? — haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?
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14 abstract class: A class that cannot be directly instantiated
Общая лексика: абстрактный класс: класс, из которого нельзя непосредственно создавать объекты (см. Designing Concurrent, Distributed, and Real-time Applications with UML (Object Technology Series) by Has)Универсальный англо-русский словарь > abstract class: A class that cannot be directly instantiated
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16 abstract coupling: Given a class A that maintains a reference to an abstract class B, class A is said to be abstractly coupled to B. We call this abstract coupling because A refers to a type of object, not a concrete object
Общая лексика: абстрактная свяУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > abstract coupling: Given a class A that maintains a reference to an abstract class B, class A is said to be abstractly coupled to B. We call this abstract coupling because A refers to a type of object, not a concrete object
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English-Russian dictionary of modern telecommunications > abstract data object
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18 абстрактный объект
ООП abstract objectБольшой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > абстрактный объект
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19 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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20 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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